Civil Rights--Exclusion of Patron from Race Track (Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249 (1947)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 22 
Number 1 Volume 22, November 1947, Number 
1 
Article 10 
July 2013 
Civil Rights--Exclusion of Patron from Race Track (Madden v. 
Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249 (1947)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1947) "Civil Rights--Exclusion of Patron from Race Track (Madden v. Queens 
County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249 (1947))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 22 : No. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol22/iss1/10 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL RIGHTS-EXCLUSION OF PATRON FROM RACE TRACK.-
Plaintiff, a citizen of good repute and standing, was barred from de-
fendant's race track under the mistaken belief that plaintiff was a
bookmaker. Plaintiff commenced an action seeking a judgment de-
claring that he had a right, as citizen and taxpayer, to enter the race
course and patronize the pari-mutuel betting if he paid the required
admission price. Defendant asserted an unlimited power of exclu-
sion. Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed. Held, dismissal affirmed.
Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N. Y. 249, 72 N. E. 2d
697 (1947), cert. denied, - U. S. --, 92 L. ed. 18 (1947).
At common law a distinction was drawn between persons en-
gaged in a public calling, such as an innkeeper or common carrier,
and keepers of public places of amusement and resort, such as bath
houses and theaters. The former were deemed to be under a general
duty to the public to serve all persons who sought accommodations
from them.1 On the other hand, keepers of public places of amuse-
ment and resort, including a race course, were under no such duty
but could- discriminate arbitrarily and serve whomever they chose.
2
The common law power of exclusion continues today, except as modi-
fied by legislation.3 In New York the only restrictive legislation ex-
plicitly covering "race courses" is the Civil Rights Law § 40, which
limits the power by prohibiting discrimination because of race, creed,
color or national origin.4
In the case at bar plaintiff asserts his right as founded upon the
constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the law.5 Plaintiff's
argument is based upon two assumptions: first, that the license to
conduct pari-mutuel betting constitutes the licensee an administrative
agent of the state in the execution of the law, and second, that the
license to conduct horse racing is a franchise to perform a public
purpose.
ISee People v. King, 110 N. Y. 418, 18 N. E. 245 (1888). See also
Whynian, Public Callings and the Trust Problem, 17 HA. L. Rav. 156, 159
(1903). The author therein states, "The innkeeper is in a common calling
under severe penalty if he do not serve all that apply, while the ordinary shop-
keeper is in a private calling free to refuse to sell if he is so minded."2 WoollCott v. Shubert, 217 N. Y. 212, 111 N. E. 829 (1916) ; People ex
rel. Burnham v. Flynn, 189 N. Y. 180, 82 N. E. 169 (1907) ; see Aaron v. Ward,
203 N. Y. 351, 357, 96 N. E. 736, 738 (1911).
3 Christie v. 46th St. Theatre Corp., 265 App. Div. 255, 39 N. Y. S. 2d
454 (3d Dep't 1942), aff'd, 292 N. Y. 520, 54 N. E.2d 206 (1942).
4 See also N. Y. PENAp LAW §§ 514, 700.
5 U. S. CisT. AMENI. XIV, § 1.
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As to the first argument propounded by the plaintiff the New
York Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law § 9 provides that the licensee of a
race course shall retain 10% of the total deposits and pay therefrom
"to the state tax commission as a reasonable tax by the state for the
privilege of conducting pari-mutuel betting," an amount equal to a
certain percentage of the total pool. This tax is imposed upon the
licensee for the privilege of conducting pari-mutuel betting and not
upon the bettor for the privilege of betting. Therefore, the licensee
is not acting as an administrative agent in collecting a tax imposed
upon the bettor for the privilege of betting. If the plaintiff's rea-
soning, based upon the first assumption, were to be followed the pro-
prietor of any business which required a license or which was taxed
would necessarily be considered an administrative agent of the state.
Such is not the law in New York.6
The plaintiff's second assumption is that the license to conduct
horse racing is a franchise to perform a public purpose. The case of
Grannan v. Westchester Racing Association 7 advanced the theory
that a racing association is a corporation organized for a public pur-
pose, enjoying a public franchise, and therefore, the public had an
interest which required the corporation to admit to its racing course
all persons who applied for admission and paid the entrance fee. In
other words, it placed a race course "... in the same category with
bridge, ferry, transportation companies, and others, in which the pub-
lic has rights firmly secured which may not be denied either to it or
to individuals composing it." 8 That theory was rejected by the
Court of Appeals.9
The operation of a race track is not a public function; it is essen-
tially a place of amusement and "... . amusement of the populace has
never been regarded as a function or purpose of government." 'o The
mere licensing, plus the incidental advantage of improving the breed
of horses, does not make the purpose a public one and the license,
in effect, a franchise.1' A franchise is "a special privilege conferred
by government upon an individual or corporation which does not
belong to the citizens of the country generally, of common right." 12
6 Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N. Y. 249, 72 N. E. 2d 697
(1947).
7Grannan v. Westchester Racing Ass'n, 16 App. Div. 8, 44 N. Y. Supp.
790 (2d Dep't 1897).
8Id. at 14.
9 See Grannan v. Westchester Racing Ass'n, 153 N. Y. 449, 47 N. E. 896
(1897). Plaintiff was a jockey, and the court in that case dealt with the rea-
sonable regulations of the jockey club. Court refused to answer the question
as to whether the racing association had the right to admit as spectators those
whom it may elect, and to exclude others solely of its own volition.
10Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N. Y. 249, 254, 72 N. E. 2d
697, 699 (1947).
11 People ex rel. Empire City Trotting Club v. State Racing Commission,
120 App. Div. 484, 485, 486, 105 N. Y. Supp. 528 (2d Dep't 1907) (by impli-
cation), aff'd, 190 N. Y. 31, 82 N. E. 723 (1907).
12 BLACK's LAW DicTiONARY 810 (3d ed. 1933).
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The privilege of conducting horse races for stakes exists at common
law and though rendered illegal, except as specially authorized, a li-
cense to conduct horse racing does not create a privilege, but merely
removes the statutory bar to exercising that privilege.' 3 A license
is no more than "a permission to exercise a pre-existing right which
has been subject to regulation in the interest of the public welfare." 14
The granting of a license to promote the public good, in and of itself,
makes neither the purpose a public one nor the license a franchise.
Nor does it place the licensee under an obligation to the public by
making his enterprise a public one.15
Plaintiff had no common law right to enter the race track, since
the defendant had an absolute right of exclusion (except as noted
heretofore), nor did the legislature create a right of entry for the
plaintiff.' 6
The principal case follows the traditional New York view. Ws
to other jurisdictions, the common law rule is subject to the abro-
gating statutes which have been passed by the respective legislatures.
J.P.M.
CRIMINAL LAW-FAIR TRIAL-DUTY OF PROSECUTOR TO RE-
FRAIN FROM OvER-ZEALOUS ADvocAc.-The defendant makes an
application for a new trial after having been found guilty of murder
in the first degree and sentenced to death. His conviction was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals. At a later date the sentence was
commuted by Governor Dewey to life imprisonment. Apparently,
the prosecuting attorney had been led to believe that the defendant
had been previously convicted of a number of other crimes. The
prejudicial effect of questioning the defendant on this mistaken in-
formation was not mitigated by the denials of the accused. Held,
motion for a new trial granted. People v. Fishgold, - Misc. -,
71 N. Y. S. 2d 830 (1947).
"The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is
not to convict, but to see that justice is done." ' Generally it is up
to the trial judge to decide to what extent the district attorney may
cross-examine a witness as to matters that may discredit him,2 but
13 Corrigan v. Coney Island Jockey Club, 2 Misc. 512, 22 N. Y. Supp. 394
(Sup. Ct 1893).14 Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N. Y. 249, 255, 72 N. E. 2d
697, 699 (1947)-
15 Cases cited note 2 supra.
16 N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTs LAW § 40. This statute pertains only to discrimina-
tion based upon creed, color, race or national origin.
1 Canons of Professional Ethics, American Bar Association, Canon V.2 Cf. Friedel v. Board of Regents, 296 N. Y. 347, 73 N. E. 2d 545 (1947);
La Beau v. The People, 34 N. Y. 223, 33 Hov. Pr. (N. Y. 1866).
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